confidentiality, technical expertise, time and cost efficiency. 2 In the international level, in particular, it is rare for a commercial contract of a certain economic significance not to contain an arbitration clause, 3 while the very successful United Nations New York
Convention of 1958 on recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 4 makes it easier to enforce an arbitral award than a court judgment in another country.
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In the words of a commentator,
"Merchants will not conduct business across national boundaries if there is no guarantee of either basic contractual accountability or the provision of remedies for material breach of contract. Arbitration civilizes the international marketplace and thereby makes it accessible to commercial parties … [Arbitration] makes the risks of transborder commerce palatable".

6
Arbitration and competition law are quite a strange pair. They can be regarded as inherently contradictory and incompatible, but also as inherently complementary and compatible to each other.
They are inherently contradictory and incompatible, because arbitration is the creation of private autonomy. Its basis is the agreement of the parties to submit a future or current dispute to private individuals, the arbitrators, whom they themselves choose, thus voluntarily withdrawing the regulation of their rights and obligations from the ambit of public justice.
Conversely, competition law is the state mechanism, whose function is to restrain inappropriate private conduct in the market, in order to maximise the benefits of the economic activity of firms for the public good. In that sense, private autonomy is subject to control for the public interest. That explains the public policy nature of such rules.
2 See e.g. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra note 1, p. 1. 3 Parties to international commercial agreements usually submit their disputes to institutional arbitration (as opposed to ad hoc arbitration). In institutional arbitration, arbitral proceedings are administered by an institution in accordance with its rules of arbitration. Such an institution is par excellence the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), based in Paris. 4 
United Nations New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards; entry into force on 7 June 1959; published in: 330 UNTS 38 (1959) , no. 4739; in force in more than 140 countries and territories. 5 While EU Member States have concluded an international convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the 1968 Brussels Convention, which has now been transformed to an EU Regulation (Reg. arbitration were seen as particularly alarming. 13 Such a possibility was correlated with anecdotal evidence that international arbitrators sitting in non-EU jurisdictions, which were important arbitration centres, were not paying due deference to the EU competition rules.
14 The arbitration milieu, on its part, initially saw EU competition law and the wide powers of enforcement of the European Commission with some suspicion, if not fear. The public policy nature of the competition rules and the fact that until comparatively recently these rules were not considered arbitrable, created a rather defensive attitude of arbitrators who were usually preferring to avoid dealing with such problematic questions, rather than risk their awards'
non-enforcement or annulment on public policy or non-arbitrability grounds. 15 At the same time, arbitration specialists rejected what they saw as the Commission's interventionist and disrespectful approach vis-à-vis arbitration. 16 This state of affairs has changed profoundly in the last fifteen years. 17 The Commission stopped obliging the parties to an exempted agreement to notify future arbitral awards, and current block exemption regulations do not contain provisions on the withdrawal of the block exemption's protection in the event of an offending arbitral award.
Indeed, of late, one may even speak of an embrace of arbitration by the Commission as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that can be complementary and ancillary to competition law enforcement. Thus, there has been a whole series of recent merger decisions, 18 clearing concentrations subject to certain conditions or obligations, one of which is recourse to arbitration for certain disputes. In those cases, arbitration is used as a 13 See idem, pp. 16 Initially, the Commission had imposed duties on private parties, through some old individual and block exemptions, to notify to it arbitration proceedings and arbitral awards. The Commission had also intervened once in the past to enjoin parties from enforcing an arbitral award that was considered The same change of climate can be sensed in the arbitration side. Arbitrators currently feel much more at ease with competition rules and apply or refer to them as a matter of course, indeed, exceptionally they even raise them ex officio. 22 Arbitrators and arbitration specialists have also seen positively the recent embrace of arbitration by the Commission and the proposed use of arbitration in Commission decisions. 23 This has meant increased opportunities for arbitration in an area where its flexibility, informality and swiftness can be critical.
B. How Competition Law Issues Arise in Arbitration
Arbitrators usually come across competition law issues in an incidental way. In most cases there will be a contractual dispute and the competition law question will be raised as a . 21 The term "delegation" is not used in the strictly legal sense, but rather in a political science one. Indeed, legally speaking, the public enforcement powers of the Commission cannot be delegated to private parties ( agreement -will contain an arbitration clause and the plaintiff will advance claims based on breach of contract, while the defendant will raise the nullity of the contract or of certain parts thereof.
One cannot exclude, however, the possibility that EU competition law could also be pleaded as a sword before arbitrators. This could happen in case of a co-contractor's damages claim because of harm incurred through his counter-party's violation of the competition rules or in a similar case involving a member of an illegal cartel and his direct purchasers. In most of these rather rare cases, typically, there will be a pre-existing arbitration clause (clause compromissoire). On the other hand, it is rare to see a non-contractual liability case be decided by arbitrators, if there is not yet any arbitration clause, since it would be almost impossible for the litigants to conclude an arbitration agreement after the dispute has arisen (compromis).
In sum, the way a competition law-related dispute arises before the arbitrators bears no difference at all from the way it comes before the courts.
C. Arbitrability of EU Competition Law
An old question of theoretical and practical significance has been the "arbitrability" of competition law-related disputes, i.e. whether the parties to an arbitration clause can submit to arbitration such disputes and whether the arbitrators themselves have the power to decide them. It is basically the contractual nature of private arbitration that gives rise to this question. Arbitration is the creation of private autonomy and, for this reason, it has long been debated whether certain "public law" disputes that pertain to the public interest can be settled and submitted to arbitration.
In addition, private autonomy has a secondary role in competition law disputes. Indeed, competition law places limits upon it. 24 Thus, if we take Article 101 TFEU as our paradigm, the nullity of anti-competitive agreements is absolute and must be raised by courts ex officio, notwithstanding the will of the litigants. Then, during the civil proceedings, a competition authority may wish to intervene as amicus curiae and make submissions if the protection of the public interest so requires. At the same time, parties cannot settle their disputes through an in-court or out-of-court settlement that runs counter to competition law. In addition, private parties cannot dispose of the antitrust rules or exclude their applicability.
This has important consequences for the treatment of the competition rules in the course of a dispute both domestically and internationally. This is also supported by the arbitration practice itself, which is quite rich on the question of arbitrability. In particular, the plea that a certain dispute is not arbitrable because it pertains to public rules on the protection of free competition has been heard quite often by arbitrators and has been invariably rejected. In all of these cases, the usual approach taken by arbitrators is that competition law is arbitrable and therefore the arbitration clause itself is fully operative and gives the power to the arbitral tribunal to hear arguments and decide a dispute that also involves competition law. From this analysis, it is evident that the arbitrability of EU competition law is no longer questioned and should be taken for granted.
The 1999 Eco Swiss 31 ruling of the Court of Justice by implication also supports this proposition. 32 The Court, by deciding on the duties of national courts to safeguard the effectiveness of EU competition law and to refuse to recognise or to set aside arbitral awards that offend against the public policy (ordre public) of the forum, implicitly ruled on the arbitrability of those rules. with a high level of expertise, thus minimising any risks owed to the judge's possibly limited knowledge of a highly technical field. 44 At the same time, the increased flexibility of the arbitral procedure, in comparison to that of state justice, suits well antitrust, whose substance might sometimes be at pains with the straitjacket of a national code of civil procedure. This is particularly true of national rules of evidence, which can be a considerable hurdle for an antitrust case in national courts, as opposed to arbitral tribunals, which may avail themselves of much more extensive powers of discovery. 45 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that arbitrators, even before the introduction of the legal exception system, have on some occasions felt quite at ease to hear arguments and base their awards on considerations pertaining to Article 101(3) TFEU, thus applying this provision "by the back door". 46 In sum, arbitrators, exactly as state courts, enjoy now the power to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in full.
III. THE APPLICATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW BY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS
A. EU Competition Law as Applicable Law in Trans-border Disputes in General
Before addressing the specific question of the arbitrators' power or duty to apply EU competition law in an international arbitration, we proceed to some introductory observations on the relationship between EU competition law and private international in the context of trans-border private law disputes.
In such cases, there are two specific mechanisms in private international law which lead to the application of substantive EU competition law to certain conduct. Under the first mechanism, and if the parties to the specific legal relationship have not chosen an applicable law, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are considered to contain an indirect unilateral conflicts rule which defines the cases that fall within their scope. 47 The rule is unilateral, because EU law itself demands its application if there is a sufficiently close connection with the territory of the EU. 48 This is a characteristic not only of EU competition law, but also of a wide range of EU Directives. 49 It is also indirect because the relevant provisions do not spell this out expressly; rather, the conclusion is reached by interpreting those specific norms. 50 The criterion for the application of the EU competition rules is whether certain agreement, practice or behaviour prevents, restricts or distorts competition within the internal market in a causal, foreseeable and substantial way. 51 Such an effect constitutes a sufficiently "close link"
with the EU Member States to justify the application of the EU competition rules.
Such a conflicts rule exists in most national competition laws, which also use as a connecting link (facteur de rattachement) the impact of the anti-competitive conduct on their markets.
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German competition law offers an example in Section 130(2) GWB, which provides that the In fact, such rules may exceptionally be universal or bilateral as well as unilateral. In such cases the national conflicts rule refers to the applicability not only of domestic competition law, but also of the competition laws of third countries. Swiss law follows this approach.
Article 137 of the Swiss Act on Private International Law lays down that when anticompetitive conduct affects or refers to a specific foreign market, the competition rules of that jurisdiction should be applicable to that conduct with regard to related tortious claims.
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There is, however, a second mechanism whereby the Treaty competition rules will be applicable. As explained above, in the international context, antitrust norms pertain to the public policy of the forum and are considered to fall under the category of mandatory norms Note that the public policy exception in the context of conflict of laws, to be found in Arts. 21 and 26 of the Rome I and Rome II Conventions, respectively, is a methodologically different instrument of negative rather than positive function, than mandatory norms are, though the two concepts broadly refer to the same interests that are deemed fundamental. In other words, the public policy exception merely safeguards that a certain provision of the specified law does not lead to consequences contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the forum. It does not, however, lead to the positive application of the forum's mandatory norms. This result is attained only through the compulsory application of these rules through their being considered as internationally mandatory norms (lois d'application immédiate). 
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It is this second characteristic of the EU competition rules that becomes important in a transnational context, particularly for international arbitration.
B. The Specific Case of Arbitration
The application of EU competition law by arbitrators raises a number of very specific questions because of the distinct features of arbitration.
Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism and arbitrators themselves are private judges whose task is to resolve a dispute that the parties have placed before them. They are not state organs and are not entrusted with the safeguarding of any public interest or public policy as such. Indeed, unlike state courts, international commercial arbitration has no forum and no lex fori, since its seat cannot be properly considered a forum. 59 This means that arbitrators are not bound by any particular conflict of laws or private international law rules 60 and, at the same time, are not bound by any mandatory norms (lois d'application immediate) of any forum. For them, all such norms are essentially tantamount to mandatory norms of a third country.
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At the same time, arbitrators do not function in a vacuum. They cannot act as vehicles of illegality, since, in the eyes of EU competition law, they are undertakings themselves. This means that if they were to act as facilitators of cartels and if the arbitration process were a sham, essentially being an internal mechanism to a cartel, they would themselves be liable to show that arbitrators are conscious of competition law and that they deal with such issues appropriately, certainly in no less satisfactory ways than state courts. In any event, the above hypothetical scenarios and risks are an adequate safeguard and arbitrators act in a prudent and practical manner, when an EU competition law question arises.
We will come back to this question below, at the section on the public policy control, but, for the time being, it suffices make the following distinctions, when speaking about the application of EU competition by an international arbitral tribunal:
(a) In a situation where the arbitrators consider that the law applicable (lex causae) to the specific legal relationship in question and thus to the merits of the dispute is the 137 of the Swiss Act on Private International Law, which has introduced a general and universal connecting link for competition law-related torts.
b. Second, the arbitrators may rely on a system of conflict of laws that allows for foreign mandatory norms to be taken into account under certain conditions. Thus, for example, Article 19 of the Swiss Act on Private International Law allows Swiss courts to "take into account" foreign mandatory norms if the interests of one party advocate this, and if there is a close connection between the facts of the case and the specific legal system to which the mandatory norms belong. Similarly, Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation provides that effect may be given to mandatory norms of third countries where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful.
c. Finally and more importantly, the arbitrators may decide to apply EU competition law, without necessarily relying on a specific conflicts rule, because they consider this appropriate, taking into account the enforceability of their award. In other words, when the arbitrators see that ignoring EU competition law would prejudice the award's chances of recognition and enforcement in the EU Member States, they take a practical approach and decide to apply the Treaty competition provisions, sometimes even ex officio, notwithstanding the parties' selection of law or seat of arbitration.
We will return to this question below, when we analyse the control of arbitral awards by courts on public policy grounds.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF ARBITRATION IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
A. Arbitration Is not Covered by the Cooperation Duties of Regulation 1/2003
The basic premises of the system of EU competition law enforcement are to be found in The question remains whether the intervention of a competition authority would be possible, if the arbitration agreement itself provided for such a possibility or if the arbitrators were to give permission to this and both parties gave their consent. 75 In such an exceptional case, the flexibility of arbitration would advocate in favour of a positive answer. However, there are good policy reasons that plead against placing too much emphasis on the consent of the parties. In practice, it will be quite difficult for a party to the arbitration proceedings to resist the Commission's or another competition authority's intervention without raising its suspicions and thus without attracting its "attention". A party may in some cases volens nolens acquiesce in such an intervention. To condition such a mechanism solely on the parties' consent would not be appropriate.
Therefore, arbitrators should seek or allow such intervention only in those cases where either the arbitration agreement explicitly refers to this possibility or the two parties genuinely agree and urge the arbitrators to ask the Commission to intervene in order to shed light on to some important competition law question. If the above rather exceptional conditions are met, in most cases, it will be preferable to allow the European Commission to interfere only through the submission of arguments in writing, without however giving it the power to participate in the arbitration hearings or to have access to the file of the case and to documents produced during the proceedings. This solution has been followed in the context of NAFTA arbitration, which is certainly very different from a purely private commercial arbitration, but could be considered by analogy.
B. General Exclusion of Arbitration from the Cooperation Notice
The absence of any reference to arbitration in Regulation 1/2003 may not be surprising.
However, one would have welcomed at least a reference to arbitration in the accompanying soft law measures of modernisation, in particular in the Notice on cooperation between the Commission and national courts. 77 Regrettably, 78 not only is the Notice silent, but actually excludes by implication arbitration tribunals, by adopting, in our view entirely unreasonably and unnecessarily, a definition of "court" that follows the "court or tribunal" criterion of In any event, however, it is reasonable to believe that the Commission intended to exclude arbitration only from the specific procedural framework of the new cooperation Notice, which contains self-imposed deadlines for the Commission's assistance. The Commission probably wanted to entertain requests from arbitrators on an ad hoc and fully discretionary basis, rather than being bound to engage in a dialogue with arbitrators as it is bound to do so with courts. 84 In any event, the soft law nature of the cooperation Notice means that its mechanisms can be used by analogy also by arbitrators.
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Thus, on an informal basis, arbitrators should be able to seek cooperation, whenever a legal or factual problem arises in regard to a question of enforcement of EU competition law. This is for the following reasons:
reasons as maybe the ECJ was. • Any disrespectful attitude of the Commission towards arbitration in this regard would run counter the long-established recognition of arbitration in all Member States as an alternative judicial forum.
• At the same time, it would not serve the Commission's purpose to further the decentralised civil enforcement of EU competition law, and it might alienate arbitrators, with the possible repercussion that the latter would rather suppress a difficult competition law issue, instead of running the risk to decide it wrongly themselves and consequently to expose their award to annulment.
• Finally, a negative approach towards such requests of assistance by arbitrators would not be in conformity with the Commission's central role in the enforcement of the competition law regime of the Treaty. competition authorities' more favourable approach towards arbitration, the Commission is expected to cooperate more often with arbitral tribunals in appropriate cases. As for the kind of assistance that arbitrators could request, this would not be substantially different from that, which the courts may request. 90 It covers:
• factual information, for example questions on the identity of the undertakings concerned; or
• information on whether a certain case is pending before the Commission; or
• whether the latter has reached a decision or a reasoned opinion in this matter.
It may also refer to:
• a legal issue of EU competition law, as well as to
• economic data, such as statistics, market characteristics, and economic analyses.
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Whether the request of such information or assistance by the Commission is desirable, is, of course, only for the arbitrators to decide. It is a question of the law governing the arbitration procedure (lex arbitri) and of the arbitration clause itself, whether an arbitrator may use such a facility sua sponte. This is a sensitive issue, because the privity of the arbitral process recedes, and arbitrators will have to show extreme diligence. Indeed, according to one view, arbitral tribunals should abstain from seizing the Commission, since the parties have submitted their dispute only to them and the applicability of Article 101 TFEU is still a question of law, which only they should deal with.
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Most likely, they could take such an initiative, if one of the parties has filed a complaint with the Commission, thus having brought the matter already to its attention, provided both parties consent; or if the terms of reference of the arbitration allow it. 93 In any case, specific consultations with and hearing of all parties seem to be necessary. 94 could enjoin the parties to supply him with certain legal or economic information or data, while stressing to them that this information could be easily requested from the Commission, if they consented to that.
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C. A Notice on Cooperation with Arbitrators?
Though not necessary, it might still be desirable for the Commission to publish a Notice or perhaps make a public announcement on cooperation with arbitration tribunals. 96 Such a
Notice could provide for a more structured dialogue between the Commission and arbitrators, while increasing the transparency of the whole system of cooperation. It would also raise the competition law awareness of arbitrators and of the parties to an arbitration, without encroaching on the flexibility and privity of the arbitral process.
In any case, the Commission would not be legally bound to provide ssistance to arbitral tribunals, although it is evident that it is to its interest to do so. 97 This is a direct consequence of the non-applicability of Article 4(3) TEU to arbitrators. Since the latter are not under any EU law duty, as against the EU institutions, similarly the Commission should not be so bound. A Notice would essentially be a list of best practices and procedures available to arbitrators for seizing the Commission. It should be based more on discretion than on obligation and the Commission should be ready to give rather than take, precisely because offering assistance to arbitrators willing the competition rules, would enhance the overall effectiveness of such rules.
It should finally be noted that any informal cooperation between arbitrators and the Commission should not be reserved to arbitration tribunals sitting within the EU, but should be available for all international arbitration tribunals irrespective of the seat of the arbitration.
In the first place, it would nowadays be futile to distinguish between EU and non-EU arbitral tribunals, since it is often difficult to identify the "nationality" of an arbitral tribunal. Second, if the main duty and concern of the European Commission is to ensure that the principles of where an arbitration tribunal sits but rather whether some potentially anti-competitive agreements or practices might affect the internal market.
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EU competition law may be enforced extraterritorially against anti-competitive acts, as long as the latter are implemented or produce substantial effects inside the EU territory, no matter if they were concluded in or directed from a third country. By the same token, if there is an on-going arbitration outside the European Union, and if an issue arises pertaining to EU antitrust law, it would be rather contradictory for the Commission to deny access to its resources to such an arbitral tribunal. The Commission should entertain such a request without examining the nationality of the arbitrators and parties involved or the applicable law of the dispute (lex causae). The only concern must be whether there is a genuine dispute, which prima facie relates to conduct potentially caught by the EU competition rules.
V. CONFLICTS OF RESOLUTION BETWEEN ARBITRATION AND COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
A. Arbitration and Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003
Since arbitration tribunals, just as national courts, enjoy parallel competences in the application of the Treaty competition rules with the Commission (and other national competition authorities), conflicts of resolution are not excluded. However, the existence of such conflicts between arbitration and the Commission do not give rise to the same concerns and issues as those arising with national courts.
In the case of national courts, the main concern is related to the more fundamental features of the supranational structure of the European Union and the principle of supremacy of EU law.
It is in this context of supranationalism that we must see the specific principles on the resolution of conflicts set out in the However, notwithstanding the absence of a formal duty to that extent, the arbitral tribunal will have to be cautious, particularly when the case entails some kind of hard core behaviour.
It is certainly best-advised to give proper attention to the Commission's decision and in appropriate circumstances to consider it as persuasive. likely make the arbitral award in this case immune from annulment, since if the more correct approach is followed, such an award cannot be said to violate public policy.
In other words, public policy comes into play only with regard to a serious violation of substantive competition law and not with regard to the existence of a conflicting award, which is more a "procedural" question. 109 The public policy nature of a rule is a different matter from the binding effect of a decision of an authority or court over the arbitration tribunal. Indeed, the Court of Justice's Eco Swiss ruling, which declared the public policy nature of the Treaty competition rules, was based on the concern to ensure that no anticompetitive effects occur on the market. It was not the Court's concern whether a decision by power, if it wishes, to depart from the findings of a Commission decision does not mean that the tribunal will surely violate the competition rules or that its award will surely violate public policy. In other words, it is the arbitral award that changes the legal reality and must thus be examined whether it violates public policy, and not the decision of the arbitrators to depart from or to follow a Commission decision.
There has been a view that an arbitration tribunal should never depart from a decision of the It is therefore unclear, under the above reading, why a national judgment rejecting a setting aside action or recognising and enforcing an arbitral award would give rise to a conflict with the operative part of a Commission's decision which imposes a fine and includes an injunction.
B. Arbitration and National Laws Conferring a Binding Effect on NCAs' decisions
A word should be said about those national laws that have specific provisions on the effect on civil proceedings of infringement decisions taken by antitrust authorities. A comparative analysis of national laws confirms that, in most legal systems, private enforcement remains independent of public enforcement. 115 Although a pre-existing decision by an administrative authority may be used by the courts and the litigants to establish and prove certain facts, in particular in case of follow-on civil actions, such a decision does not normally acquire the status of binding authority, though it can certainly be persuasive authority. The principle of ordinary courts, this will be a good indication that its scope includes arbitration. 119 In any event, the question of binding effect is not of great practical significance because the above national provisions refer only to follow-on civil claims for damages, which are very rarely submitted to arbitration.
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C. Direct Intervention by the Commission as an Exceptional Corrective Mechanism
There are exceptional cases where a public antitrust authority can directly intervene in an arbitration and where the arbitrators themselves are directly subject to the authority's powers.
A relevant precedent is the Organic Peroxides case, 121 where the European Commission did not shy away from fining a cartel facilitator which had acted as a secretary to the parties and facilitated the implementation of the agreement. In the extreme case where an arbitration tribunal is internal to the cartel and has the function to ensure compliance and to discipline cartel members that "cheat" on the cartel's decisions, there is no valid reason why these "arbitrators" should not be subject to the full powers of the Commission, as well as to penalties. Arbitrators, like other professionals such as lawyers, 122 are undertakings and would act here as an ancillary vehicle that supports, reinforces and facilitates the anti-competitive conduct.
The Commission also has many indirect ways to interfere with arbitration proceedings or awards which it considers to be detrimental to EU competition law. It has retorted to such indirect routes on one occasion in the past, in the Preflex/Lipski case. 123 The facts were that an arbitral award had required that the defendant continue to pay license fees pursuant to a patent licensing agreement after the expiry of the patents. The Commission held that this agreement as interpreted by the arbitral award, which in fact had even been subsequently approved by a national court, 124 was incompatible with the Treaty competition rules. It did not, of course, set aside the arbitral award or -obviously -the national court's judgment, since this is not possible under EU law. It did, however, communicate its objections to the parties and in essence rejected the construction given by the arbitral tribunal to the problematic contractual clause. 125 As a result, the parties complied with the Commission's views and reached a settlement, thus putting an end to the dispute.
Such a Commission practice can have far-reaching consequences in like situations.
Essentially, it could mean that each party to an agreement can, at least indirectly, bring an arbitral award before the Commission, by filing a complaint with it, hoping that the Commission will in effect enjoin the parties from enforcing the agreement, if the latter, as construed by the award, is found to be incompatible with EU antitrust rules. The result is that the res judicata effect of the arbitral award in question will only be nominal.
Such an -indeed remote -possibility can be a powerful deterrent and corrective mechanism in appropriate cases. This may be so, where the arbitral award manifestly disregards EU competition law, for example by upholding a per se anti-competitive conduct, such as a blunt market sharing or price fixing agreement, and when it is apparent that the parties had submitted their dispute to arbitration in order to evade the application of EU competition law.
Of course, it is likely that the Commission will intervene only in those cases where the enforcement of the arbitral award by the parties can be expected to have serious anticompetitive effects on the market.
A Commission intervention to enjoin the parties from enforcing a final arbitral award, especially after a national court has sanctioned an arbitral award, should be a rare course, to be taken only if there is at stake a strong EU public interest necessitating intervention, and not just the individual interest of the loosing party of the arbitration. 126 The Commission should not, therefore, allow itself to be considered as an "appeal tribunal" in such arbitrations but should leave this to the initiative of the losing party and to the courts to remedy pursuant to the applicable civil procedures.
VI. THE ULTIMATE SAFEGUARD: THE PUBLIC POLICY CONTROL OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
A. Eco Swiss
Quite apart from any other preventive or corrective mechanism for the effective application of the Treaty competition provisions by arbitrators, review by state courts constitutes the ultimate and most efficient safeguard. The EU competition rules make up the fundamental economic system of the Union and of its Member States and enjoy, therefore, a public policy (ordre public) character. The ordre public nature of the EU competition provisions and the duty of EU Member State courts to review and set aside arbitral awards that violate those fundamental provisions were forcefully pronounced in Eco Swiss.
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The Court of Justice recognised the legitimate interest of Member States that the judicial review of arbitral awards be limited. However, in view of the fundamental importance of
Article 101 TFEU and having regard to the necessity of a uniform and effective application of EU competition law, something which under Article 4(3) TEU only national courts can safeguard, it went on to stress that such national courts were under a duty to set aside awards that violate the competition rules. 128 Of particular importance was under the Court's reasoning the inability of arbitrators to address Article 267 TFEU preliminary references on matters of EU law to the Court of Justice as a result of Nordsee. 129 It was up to national courts to send such references to Luxembourg, while exercising their review powers over arbitral awards. Obstructive national procedural rules, such as the rule that a party may not raise for the first time issues at a setting aside proceeding, should not, therefore, be followed.
For the Court of Justice, the review of arbitral awards for violation of EU competition law goes through public policy. The EU competition rules express an EU public policy, which is integrated in each national notion of ordre public. 
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The requirement that arbitral awards be submitted to a "communitarised" notion of public policy deserves approval. Any different solution would give rise to an unprecedented forum shopping inside the Union, where parties would opt for the jurisdiction that would be less interposing on arbitral proceedings and awards. relied upon it to make the public policy argument. The parties had expert legal advice throughout the arbitration proceedings and the arbitrators were experienced, yet the competition issue never arose. The Court of Appeal noted this rather inconsistent behaviour of the plaintiff (venire contra factum proprium) and was not impressed by the EU competition law point. Although it did accept that the competition law arguments were not totally frivolous, it held that they required a detailed examination of the substance, for which the court and the setting aside procedure were ill-suited, otherwise this would mean reviewing the merits of the case (révision au fond), which French law, like most modern arbitration laws, do not allow for. It is evident from the judgment that the court considered the competition law argument not totally frivolous but, at the same time, not "eye-catching" enough to substantiate a violation of public policy. The infringement of the competition rules had to be "manifest" for the setting aside action to be successful.
This approach was followed by the Paris Court of Appeal also in Cytec. 135 In that case, the arbitral tribunal had rendered two awards. In the first final award, the tribunal found that the main contract was in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU and declared it null and void. However, in the second award, the tribunal awarded damages based on the situation in which the parties would have found themselves had the illegal agreement not been signed. The French court declared the second award, which was rendered in Belgium, as enforceable and refused to reexamine the merits of the dispute. The appellate judgment was then confirmed by the French Supreme Court, which repeated the Thalès standard of review.
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The same approach was also recently followed by the Higher Regional Court of Thüringen in that these clauses amounted to a restriction of competition and the award should not be enforceable in Germany.
The German court, however, rejected this argument. The court did acknowledge that EU competition law should be deemed to form part of public policy in Germany and referred to
Eco Swiss but did not find the arbitral award to be inconsistent with Article 101 TFEU.
However, the court argued that the territorial restriction only affected the trade outside the EU and therefore did not fall within the scope of Article 101 TFEU. With respect to the fieldof-use restriction, the Court held that for the product affected by the field-of-use restriction, no market in the EU existed to date. Secondly, the Court was of the view that the field-of-use restriction only prevented the affected party from selling products in the EU as far as they were produced on the basis of the licensed technology. The party therefore was considered to be free to distribute in the EU products based on technologies. The court also pointed out that restrictions of this kind could be exempt under Article 101(3) TFEU. In any event, the court held that the public policy control exercised by German courts over arbitral awards could not go as far as revisiting the merits of the case (révision au fond).
In Italy, too, while courts accept that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU pertain to public policy, in two recent judgments, they granted enforcement to awards which had decided a competition law dispute and which were alleged to have reached an incorrect decision on this issue, purportedly in breach of public policy. In both cases the courts were satisfied that the arbitrators had sufficiently taken into account the principles of competition law in their reasoning, without needing to proceed to an in-depth review. 138 Finally, in Sweden, an appellate court refused to set aside an award for violation of the EU state aid rules, holding that an infringement of competition law can be considered a violation of public policy "only in obvious cases".
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The maximalist approach, on the other hand, relies on the rather general language of Eco Swiss and places more emphasis on the EU principle of effectiveness. According to this line 
C. A Proposed Balanced Approach for Review of Arbitral Awards
In our view, the minimalist approach or a variant thereof would be preferable for both legal and policy reasons. 
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With regard to the specific question of the public policy exception, 151 the Court of Justice has consistently stressed in a series of cases that the public policy exception is meant to operate only in "exceptional cases". 152 In a judgment rendered after Eco Swiss, the Court of Justice had to examine whether a French judgment that had allegedly violated the free movement provisions of the Treaty and Article 102 TFEU could be resisted in Italy and thus be refused recognition on public policy grounds. 153 That the free movement provisions of the Treaty and
Article 102 TFEU pertain to the public policy notion of Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention was explicitly stressed by Advocate General Alber in his Opinion 154 and implicitly accepted by the Court. 155 The Court, however, made it clear that a public policy violation was to operate in very exceptional circumstances and that an alleged violation of fundamental provisions of EU law did not suffice as such. 156 The "communitarisation" of the Brussels Convention through the adoption of Regulation 44/2001 has further reduced the scope of the public policy exception by adding an important qualification to the text of the current Article 34(1) of that Regulation: the recognition of the foreign judgment must be "manifestly" contrary to the public policy of the forum. This is indicative of the exceptional character of this provision, which has apparently led to the nonrecognition/non-enforcement of judgments only in a handful of occasions in the past.
On the basis of the above an important argument can be made that surely the function of the public policy exception in the context of arbitration must not be different from its function in the context of the enforcement of judgments. Indeed, the necessity of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards was mentioned side-by-side in the old Article 293 EC with the necessity of recognition and enforcement of judgments. Exactly like free movement of judgments, free movement of arbitral awards within the EU furthers European integration and is extremely beneficial to the four freedoms. It should therefore be accorded the same degree of deference.
Aside from these legal arguments, there are also important policy reasons advocating a more favourable view of the so-called minimalist approach:
(a) Arbitration is not just a creation of private autonomy that merely constitutes an irritant for EU competition law, but is rather a very important trans-border mechanism bringing commerce and persons together; especially in the context of EU law, arbitration is an important complement of the four freedoms and indeed it is not neglected by the Treaty of Rome. 158 If we can speak of a principle of free movement of judgments, we can also definitely speak of a free movement of arbitral awards.
(b) While the exigencies of EU law must be served, we must not lose sight of the broader picture. In the global context, arbitration is one of the most efficient mechanisms of trade but remains always vulnerable because it is entirely dependent on all parties' good will. It is to the interest of industrialised countries to ensure its effectiveness and to "preach" its qualities to developing countries. Arbitration has on occasions come under fire by some countries as a "Western imposition" and there have been many incidents where courts were particularly hostile to it. It would be regrettable if the courts of more developed countries were to introduce exceptional rules of review of arbitral awards for specific fields. A spill-over to other fields is not difficult, besides, competition law is not more special than or different from other areas of law with increased public interest elements in a specific country's domestic context. On the basis of the above, a public policy violation and a corresponding duty of national courts to set aside or refuse to enforce an arbitral award should only when the competition law issue has been totally neglected by the arbitrators with the manifest aim to evade the competition rules or in case of a prima facie illegality or conflict with such rules.
Thus, complete disregard of EU competition law and failure to address the competition law point on the part of the arbitrators, especially when the competition law infringement is rather obvious and serious, may offend against public policy. 159 It may also constitute a presumption of the parties' (and the arbitrators') intention to evade the law. However, in such cases, one must be careful not to reward conduct by parties who choose not to raise the competition law issue during the arbitration proceedings and prefer to wait and see whether they lose or win, in order to challenge the award.
Then, not every incompatibility between the arbitral award and the competition rules should qualify as a public policy violation. The competition law violation must be very serious, in order for an arbitral award to be refused recognition or enforcement on public policy grounds. 160 A restriction of competition in a horizontal agreement is likely to be more detrimental for competition than a restriction in a vertical agreement. 161 A cartel would certainly qualify as a repugnant infringement of the competition rules. 162 Another similar distinction can be made between per se rules of prohibition and rule of reason competition law violations. It should be only per se violations that should attract attention by state courts when reviewing an arbitral award. 163 The simply erroneous application of EU competition law by arbitrators would not qualify as a violation of ordre public, 164 otherwise the most fundamental principle of the finality of arbitral awards (prohibition of the review on the merits -révision au fond) would be put at stake. 165 Errors of law or fact are not considered a setting-aside ground, at least in the international arbitration context, 166 and are not a privilege of the arbitrators. State courts also make errors and there is no reason to treat arbitral tribunals different than state courts. Only in very exceptional cases of gross errors made by the arbitrators, should such review of the merits of the award result in non-recognition. 167 In sum, it seems that in all cases where the arbitrators did genuinely apply the EU competition rules, having fully considered the arguments of the parties and having provided a substantial reasoning in their award, review of the award should not be possible, even if the award erred in that application. 168 Finally, it must always be realised that in the context of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, where the scope of the public policy exception is quite narrow, it is only the effects of the recognition of an award in the territory of the forum of enforcement that matter and not the offending award's mere existence. Only if those effects are intolerable and would run counter to the most fundamental principles of law and morality in that jurisdiction, should there be a public policy violation. 169 Thus, using as example the national precedents referred to above, in our view, the Dutch judgment in MDI constitutes a dangerous precedent in Europe because it creates an exception to the cardinal rule of finality of arbitral awards and prejudices the effectiveness of the New York Convention. It shows also the excesses of the maximalist approach, which must be rejected particularly in cases such as the one at issue where the agreement merely contained a clause disapproved by a block exemption Regulation. Such a failure cannot suffice to qualify as a violation of Article 101(1) TFEU 170 and certainly as a public policy violation. It should take much more than a mere failure to fall into the ambit of a block exemption and to notify an agreement to an antitrust authority to lead a court to the dramatic option to refuse to recognise a foreign arbitral award.
D. Conclusions
The possibility of an arbitral award's being set aside or being refused recognition and enforcement in case of violation of ordre public is by far the best corrective mechanism in the application of EU competition norms by arbitrators. The mere deterrent effect of this possibility is such that it ensures in the best way that due respect will be paid to those norms.
It also fits well with the nature of arbitration and it does not endanger its flexibility and informality. Arbitrators are still the "masters of the arbitral proceedings". The difference is that they have the responsibility or the burden to exercise this discretion in an appropriate way, so as to render an enforceable award.
Indeed, a fundamental concern of the arbitrators is to render an award that will be enforceable. 171 In international commercial arbitration regard should also be given to Article 35 of the 1998 ICC Rules of Arbitration, 172 according to which "the Arbitral Tribunal … shall make every effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law". 173 The efficiency of arbitration as an institution would be compromised, if arbitrators were to render awards that would be liable to non-enforcement or annulment, because of their incompatibility with mandatory legal provisions, whose infringement surely constitutes a public policy violation. 
